completed: that of Lopez-Escobar, at Berkeley, on infinitary logic [45] (see also the papers [46] , [47] ), and that of Platek [57] , at Stanford, on admissible sets. Barwise's work on infinitary logic and admissible sets is described in his thesis [3] , the book [12] , and papers [4]- [15] . We do not try to give a systematic review of these papers. Instead, our goal is to give a coherent introduction to infinitary logic and admissible sets. We describe results of Barwise, of course, because he did so much. In addition, we mention some more recent work, to indicate the current importance of Barwise's ideas. Many of the central results are stated without proof, but occasionally we sketch a proof, to indicate how the ideas fit together.
Chapters 1 and 2 describe infinitary logic and admissible sets at the time Barwise began his work, circa 1965. From Chapter 3 on, we survey the developments that took place after Barwise appeared on the scene. §1. Background on infinitary logic. In this chapter, we describe the situation in infinitary logic at the time that Barwise began his work. We need some terminology. By a vocabulary, we mean a set L of constant symbols, and relation and operation symbols with finitely many argument places. As usual, by an L-structure M, we mean a universe set M with an interpretation for each symbol of L. In cases where the vocabulary L is clear, we may just say structure.
For a given vocabulary L and infinite cardinals µ ≤ κ, L κµ is the infinitary logic with κ variables, conjunctions and disjunctions over sets of formulas of size less than κ, and existential and universal quantifiers over sets of variables of size less than µ. All logics that we consider also have equality, and are closed under negation. The equality symbol is always available, but is not counted as an element of the vocabulary L.
As usual, ω is the first infinite ordinal, and ω 1 is the first uncountable ordinal. Thus, L ωω is the ordinary elementary first order logic, with finite conjunctions, disjunctions, and quantifiers. Formulas in L ωω are called finitary, or elementary. A set of finitary sentences, closed under logical consequence, is called an elementary first order theory. Another important case is the logic L ω1ω , which has ω 1 variables, countable disjunctions and conjunctions, and finite quantifiers. The union of L κω over all cardinals κ is the logic L ∞ω , which has a variable v α for each ordinal α, conjunctions and disjunctions over arbitrary sets of formulas, and quantifiers over finite sets of variables. In this article, we will be concerned with L ∞ω and its sublanguages. We only allow formulas with finitely many free variables.
1.1. Expressive power of L ω1ω . Some mathematically interesting classes of structures, such as algebraically closed fields of a given characteristic, are characterized by a set of axioms in L ωω . Other classes cannot be characterized in this way, but can be axiomatized by a single sentence of L ω1ω .
Example 1: The Abelian torsion groups are the models of a sentence obtained by taking the conjunction of the usual axioms for Abelian groups (a finite set) and the following further conjunct:
In [17] , Barwise and Eklof made a serious study of these groups, using infinitary sentences to express natural mathematical invariants.
Example 2: The Archimedean ordered fields are the models of a sentence obtained by taking the conjunction of the usual axioms for ordered fields and the following further conjunct:
Example 3: Let L be a countable vocabulary. Let T be an elementary first order theory, and let Γ(x) be a set of finitary formulas in a fixed tuple of variables x. The models of T that omit Γ are the models of the single L ω1ω sentence obtained by taking the conjunction of the sentences of T and the following further conjunct:
¬γ(x) .
There are many natural examples of mathematical properties expressible in L ω1ω . Let α be a countable ordinal. In the vocabulary L = {≤} of orderings, there is an L ω1ω sentence whose models are just the orderings of type α, and there is an L ω 1 ω formula saying, in a linear ordering, that the interval to the left of x has type α. In a vocabulary appropriate for Boolean algebras, there is an L ω1ω sentence whose models are just the Boolean algebras of type I(ω α ), and there is an L ω1ω formula saying, in a Boolean algebra, that x is an α-atom. In a vocabulary appropriate for groups, there is an L ω1ω formula saying, in an Abelian p-group, that x has height α.
There are limits to the expressive power of L ω1ω . Morley [50] , and LopezEscobar [47] showed that the class of well orderings is not definable in L ω 1 ω . Theorem 1.1.1 (Morley, Lopez-Escobar) . If σ is an L ω1ω sentence true in all countable well orderings, then σ has a model with a subset of order type η-the order type of the rationals.
The back-and-forth construction.
One of the earliest and most powerful tools in infinitary logic is the back-and-forth construction. This was first used by Cantor to prove that every countable dense linear ordering without endpoints is isomorphic to the rationals. Back-and-forth constructions were developed as a general method in finitary logic by Ehrenfeucht and Fraïssé, and in infinitary logic by Karp. Barwise's paper [9] gives a beautiful exposition of their role in infinitary logic.
Let M, N be structures with universes M, N , respectively. A partial isomorphism from M to N is a pair of tuples (a, b), of the same finite length, such that a is from M , b is from N , and a and b satisfy the same quantifier-free formulas. We will sometimes add new constant symbols to the vocabulary, and we note that (a, b) is a partial isomorphism from M to N if and only if the empty pair (∅, ∅) is a partial isomorphism from (M, a) to (N , b) . A back-and-forth family for M, N is a set F of partial isomorphisms from M to N such that:
We say that two structures M and N , of arbitrary cardinality, are potentially isomorphic if there is a back-and-forth family for M, N . It is obvious that isomorphic structures are potentially isomorphic. In the other direction, potentially isomorphic structures are very similar to each other, but are not necessarily isomorphic. For example, any two infinite structures with the empty vocabulary are potentially isomorphic. While two potentially isomorphic structures may not be isomorphic, Barwise [9] and Nadel [54] showed that they would become isomorphic if the set-theoretic world were extended in such a way as to collapse the cardinalities of both structures to ℵ 0 . There is one special case where potential isomorphism does imply isomorphism. Using Cantor's original argument, one can show that any two countable structures which are potentially isomorphic are isomorphic.
The link between back-and-forth constructions and infinitary logic is given by the following basic theorem of Karp [37] . Proof. For the implication from left to right, we first note that if F is a back-and-forth family witnessing the potential isomorphism of M and N and (a, b) ∈ F , then (M, a) and (N , b) are potentially isomorphic. Now, it is not difficult to show, by induction on complexity of formulas, that for all (a, b) ∈ F, M |= ϕ(a) iff N |= ϕ(b). For the implication from right to left, we define a backand-forth family F consisting of the pairs (a, b) such that the L ∞ω formulas satisfied by a in M are the same as those satisfied by b in N . Let (a, b) ∈ F, and let c ∈ M. We need d such that (ac, bd) ∈ F.
For countable structures, Karp's theorem has a simpler form. A sentence θ with the property in Theorem 1.3.1 is called a Scott sentence for M. We will first give a quick proof of Scott's Theorem, and then give a longer proof which provides additional information. We need some definitions. Consider a countable structure M. For any tuple a in M , the orbit of a is the set of tuples b such that some automorphism of M maps a to b. A partial isomorphism from M to M is called a partial automorphism of M. Note that if a and b are in the same orbit then (a, b) is a partial automorphism of M.
A Scott family for M is a set Φ of L ∞ω formulas such that for each tuple a in M ,
• There is some ϕ ∈ Φ such that M |= ϕ(a), and
, then a and b are in the same orbit.
In some settings, it is useful to allow a finite tuple of parameters in the formulas of a Scott family, in hopes of one that consists of formulas of a special form-e.g., finitary existential. In the definition above, we do not allow parameters, and we put no restrictions on the complexity of the L ∞ω formulas in the Scott family. In the case where the vocabulary and the structure are both countable, we can do better. Proof of Lemma 1.3.2. Let a be a tuple in M . For each tuple b in M , of the same length as a, if there is a formula of L ω1ω true of a and not true of b, we choose one, and we let ϕ a (x) be the conjunction of the chosen formulas. Let Φ be the set of these formulas-Φ = {ϕ a (x) : a in M }. Since M is countable, Φ is a countable set of formulas of L ω1ω . Clearly, each tuple a in M satisfies the formula ϕ a ∈ Φ. Moreover, if ϕ ∈ Φ, then ϕ = ϕ a for some tuple a in M , and ϕ defines the set of all tuples which satisfy the same L ω1ω formulas as a in M . By the corollary to Karp's Theorem, this set is the orbit of a in M . It follows that Φ is a Scott family for M.
Proof of Theorem 1.3.1. ¿From the Scott family Φ in Lemma 1.3.2, with ϕ a defining the orbit of a, we obtain a Scott sentence θ as follows. Let
(where the conjunctions and disjunctions are over all b ∈ M ). More generally, for each tuple a in M , let
.
Then the desired Scott sentence is
The longer proof of Scott's Theorem takes into account refinements due to Chang [25] and Nadel [54] , and gives additional information. The formulas in the Scott family will be chosen in a canonical way, and are defined for uncountable as well as countable vocabularies and structures. The proof gives an ordinal, the Scott height of M, which provides a measure of model-theoretic complexity. To give an idea how the argument goes, we will break it into a series of definitions and easy lemmas whose proofs are left as exercises.
We first define the quantifier rank qr(ϕ) of a formula ϕ of L ∞ω . There is no prenex normal form for L ∞ω (in general, we cannot bring all of the quantifiers to the front), but the quantifier rank is a useful substitute. The definition is by induction on the complexity of formulas.
• If ϕ is atomic, then qr(ϕ) = 0,
We write M ≡ α N if M and N satisfy the same sentences of quantifier rank at most α. It is clear that every finitary formula has finite quantifier rank, and that every formula of L ω1ω has countable quantifier rank. Now, for each structure M, tuple a in M , and ordinal α, we define the formula σ •
is the conjunction of all atomic and negated atomic formulas satisfied by a in M. ( 
It is easily seen that each countable structure M has countable Scott height.
Let α be the Scott height of M. We define the canonical Scott sentence of M to be the sentence
where the infinite conjunction is over all tuples a in M . Note that if M has Scott height α, then the canonical Scott sentence σ M has quantifier rank α + ω. Examples: The countable structure for the pure identity vocabulary, and the ordered set of rational numbers, both have Scott height 0 and are not absolutely characterizable.
We have mentioned that the Scott height gives a measure of complexity of a structure. A further distinction can be made by asking whether or not the Scott height is "attained", in the following sense. The local height of a tuple a in M is the least ordinal α such that for all tuples b in M , (M, a) ≡ α (M, b) implies that (M, a) and (M, b) are potentially isomorphic. Then the Scott height of M equals the supremum of the local heights of the tuples a in M . We will say that the Scott height is attained in M if there is a tuple a in M whose local height is equal to the Scott height of M.
Example: For each countable ordinal α > 0, the structure (α, <) is absolutely characterizable. If α is a limit ordinal, then (α, <) has Scott height α, and the Scott height is not attained. If α is a successor ordinal β + 1, then (α, <) has Scott height β, and the Scott height is attained.
1.4. ω-logic. Before proceeding with the Completeness Theorem and other results for the logic L ω1ω , we mention a somewhat simpler related logic. By an ω-vocabulary we mean a countable vocabulary L with a special constant symbol n for each n ∈ ω. A structure M (for such a vocabulary) is called an ω-model if each element a is the interpretation of the constant n for some n ∈ ω. For a proof system for deriving sentences true in all ω-models, we add to the usual finitary rules the following infinitary rule of proof, called the ω-rule:
The Henkin construction [33] is a useful method for constructing countable models for a countable set of L ωω sentences. Henkin [34] , [35] and Orey [56] used essentially the same construction to produce ω-models, in the following result. We may think of ω-logic as logic omitting the type
The ω-Completeness Theorem may be modified so that it applies to other types, or countable families of types. Given an L ω1ω -sentence ϕ, we can produce a countable elementary first order theory T and a countable family of types (Γ i (x i )) i∈ω , involving different tuples of free variables, such that ϕ has a model if and only if T has a model omitting all of the types Γ i (x i ).
Kreisel [39] proved a Compactness Theorem for ω-logic. The usual statement fails, of course. Kreisel's Compactness Theorem, which we shall state later, involves changing the notion of "finite".
1.5. Familiar theorems. C. Karp [36] gave rules of proof for L ω1ω , including the following variant of the ω-rule, for infinite conjunctions.
Karp proved the following Completeness Theorem. As usual, we write |= for logical consequence and for provability from the infinitary rules. Makkai [48] gave a useful criterion for model existence. Let L be a countable vocabulary, and let C be a countably infinite set of new constant symbols. A consistency property is a non-empty family S of finite or countable sets of sentences of (L∪C) ω1ω such that for each Φ ∈ S, Φ has no explicitly contradictory pair ψ, ¬ψ, and
• if ¬ψ ∈ Φ, and ψ¬ is the sentence obtained from ¬ψ by bringing the negations inside, then Φ ∪ {ψ¬} ∈ S.
Then ϕ has a model if and only if there is a consistency property S with an element Φ containing ϕ.
Let T be a countable set of L ω1ω sentences. Then T has a model if and only if there is a consistency property S such that for all ϕ ∈ T and all Φ ∈ S, Φ ∪ {ϕ} ∈ S.
Lopez-Escobar [45] , [46] proved the following Interpolation Theorem.
Here is a version of the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem.
The proof of Theorem 1.5.4 resembles that of the corresponding result for L ωω in that we take N to be a substructure of M. However, we do not try to preserve satisfaction for all L ω1ω formulas-there are too many. It is enough to preserve satisfaction just for the subformulas of ϕ. The possible strengthening of Theorem 1.5.4, saying that M has a substructure N , of the smaller cardinality, preserving satisfaction of all L ω 1ω formulas, is false. Example: Let M be an ordering of type ω 1 , and let N be a countable substructure of M. Now, N has order type α, for some countable ordinal α. As we mentioned before, N is absolutely characterizable, so its Scott sentence is true in N but false in M.
1.6. Failure of compactness. There are obvious differences between L ωω and L ω1ω . The usual Compactness Theorem fails. The Upward Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem also fails. We have already seen examples of sentences in L ω1ω that have infinite models, but no uncountable models. There are also sentences in L ω1ω that have uncountable models, but only up to a certain size.
Example: Let ψ be the sentence whose models are just the Archimedean ordered fields (described in §1.1). Then ψ has models of cardinality κ just for
There is a whole family of examples of this kind-sentences which, for some cardinal µ, have models of cardinality κ just for ℵ 0 ≤ κ ≤ µ. The Hanf number for a language L is the least cardinal κ such that for each sentence ϕ ∈ L, if for each cardinal µ < κ, ϕ has a model of cardinality ≥ µ, then ϕ has models of arbitrarily large cardinality. Hanf [29] observed that even abstract languages have Hanf numbers, so long as the collection of sentences is a set rather than a proper class. Theorem 1.6.1 (Hanf) . For a language with a set S of sentences, there is a cardinal κ such that for all ϕ ∈ S, if ϕ has a model of cardinality ≥ κ, then it has models of arbitrarily large cardinality.
Proof. The proof is simple. For each ϕ ∈ S such that ϕ does not have models of arbitrarily large cardinality, let µ ϕ be an upper bound on the cardinalities of models, and let κ be the least cardinal greater than any µ ϕ .
The Upward Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem shows that the Hanf number for L ωω is ℵ 0 . Morley [50] determined the Hanf number for L ω1ω . The statement involves the cardinals α , which are defined as follows:
Morley [51] also determined the Hanf number for ω-logic. The terminology needed for this result will be also be used later. An ordinal α is computable if there is a computable ordering of type α, on on ω, or a finite subset. It is not difficult to see that the computable ordinals form an initial segment of the ordinals. The first non-computable ordinal, which is still countable, is called
Theorem 1.6.3 (Morley) . The Hanf number for ω-logic is ω CK
1
. §2. Background on admissible sets. In this chapter, we will describe the situation in the theory of admissible sets at the time that Barwise began his research. An admissible set is a transitive set A such that (A, ∈) is a model of the set theory KP of Kripke [41] and Platek [57] . Here we abuse notation, writing (A, ∈) for the structure (A, R) where
The original purpose of admissible sets was to generalize classical computability theory (once called "recursion" theory) from the natural numbers to the ordinals, building on earlier work of Kleene [38] , Takeuti [63] , Tugue [64] , and Kreisel-Sacks [40] . The axioms of KP are considered to be the minimum necessary for a good notion of computation. For each ordinal α, there is a corresponding family of constructible sets L(α). An ordinal α such that (L(α), ∈) is a model of KP is called an admissible ordinal.
2.1. ∆ 0 formulas and Σ-formulas in set theory. The theory KP is an elementary first order theory in the vocabulary {∈}. It is a weakening of ZermeloFraenkel set theory where the power set axiom is removed, and the separation and collection axiom schemes are restricted to "∆ 0 " formulas. The ∆ 0 formulas, introduced by Levy in [43] , are the members of the smallest class of formulas that contains the atomic formulas in the vocabulary {∈} and is closed under finite conjunction and disjunction, bounded quantifiers (∃x ∈ u) and (∀x ∈ u), and negation. In particular, the negation of a ∆ 0 formula is a ∆ 0 formula. The Σ-formulas are the members of the smallest class of formulas which contains the ∆ 0 formulas and is closed under finite conjunction and disjunction, bounded quantifiers (∃x ∈ u) and (∀x ∈ u), and existential quantifiers (∃x). Thus, every ∆ 0 formula is a Σ formula, and every Σ formula is finitary.
The ∆ 0 and Σ formulas are of interest because of the following persistence and absoluteness properties. Given a structure (A, E) with one binary relation E, for each a ∈ A we let a E = {b ∈ A : bEa}. Intuitively, a person living in (A, E) would consider a E to be the set of elements of a. An end extension of (A, E) is an extension (B, F ) of (A, E) such that for all a ∈ A, a F = a E (that is, a gets no new elements). Note that if A and B are transitive sets, and A ⊆ B, then (B, ∈) is an end extension of (A, ∈). Now, consider an elementary first order theory T in the vocabulary of set theory. For example, T can be the theory KP . A formula ϕ(u) is said to be persistent with respect to T if whenever (A, E), (B, F ) |= T and (B, F ) is an end extension of (A, E), (A, E) |= ϕ(c) implies (B, F ) |= ϕ(c), for all c in A. A formula ϕ(u) is said to be absolute with respect to T if both ϕ and its negation are persistent with respect to T . Proposition 2.1.1. For every elementary first order theory T , every Σ formula is persistent with respect to T . Proposition 2.1.1 is proved by an easy induction on the complexity of formulas. Feferman and Kreisel [27] proved a deeper converse result, saying that every formula which is persistent with respect to T is T -equivalent to a Σ formula. A formula ϕ is said to be ∆ over T if both ϕ and ¬ϕ are T -equivalent to Σ formulas.
Corollary 2.1.2. (a) Every formula that is ∆ over a theory T is absolute with respect to T . (b) Every ∆ 0 formula is absolute with respect to every theory T .
Remark: Suppose that A, B are transitive sets, A ⊆ B, (A, ∈), (B, ∈) are models of a theory T , and ϕ(u) is a finitary formula with parameters in A which is absolute with respect to T . If C is the set defined by ϕ(u) in (B, ∈), then C ∩ A is the set defined by ϕ(u) in (A, ∈). Moreover, for each a ∈ A, the formula u ∈ a & ϕ(u) defines the same set in (B, ∈) as in (A, ∈).
2.2. Axioms of KP . Kripke-Platek set theory, or KP , has the usual axioms of extent, foundation, pairing, and union (as in ZF ), together with the following separation and collection axiom schemes.
• ∆ 0 -separation: Let ϕ(x, y) be a ∆ 0 formula with no free occurrence of v. Then we have the axiom
• ∆ 0 -collection: Let ϕ(x, y, z) be a ∆ 0 formula with no free occurrence of v. Then we have the axiom
Now that we have stated the axioms of KP , we can give a rigorous definition of admissible set. An admissible set is a transitive set A such that (A, ∈) is a model of KP .
Remark: In the axioms of KP , we included collection for ∆ 0 formulas. Collection for Σ formulas follows, and is an important basic theorem of KP . Another important basic theorem of KP is the Σ-reflection principle, which says that (in KP ) every Σ formula ϕ is equivalent to (∃u) ϕ (u) .
For an admissible set A, the least ordinal which is not an element of A is called the ordinal of A, and is denoted by o(A). The ordinal o(A) plays a major role in the subject. Note that o(A) is always a limit ordinal, and is equal to the set of all ordinals which are elements of A. Moreover, o(A) is a subset of A, definable in (A, ∈) by a ∆ 0 formula.
The smallest example of an admissible set is the set of hereditarily finite sets HF = H(ω)-a set is hereditarily finite if its transitive closure is finite. The set HF corresponds to classical computability theory, and it is the only admissible set A such that o(A) = ω. A set X ⊆ HF is said to be computably enumerable (or c.e.) if it is definable in (HF, ∈) by a Σ formula with parameters in HF. A set X is said to be computable if both X and its complement HF \ X are c.e. For X ⊆ ω, these definitions agree with the usual ones.
To highlight the analogy with classical computability theory, for an arbitrary admissible set A, the elements of A are called A-finite sets. A subset of A which is definable in (A, ∈) by a Σ formula, with parameters in A, is called A-computably enumerable, or A-c.e. A set X ⊆ A is called A-computable if both X and A \ X are A-c.e. For example, for any admissible set A, the set o(A) is A-computable but not A-finite.
Proof. Using Σ-reflection and ∆ 0 -collection, one can show that X is definable by a ∆ 0 formula in (A, ∈). Then by ∆ 0 -separation, X ∈ A. Remark: If A is admissible and X is an A-c.e. subset of an A-finite set, X need not be A-finite, or even A-computable.
Theories which are stronger than KP but weaker than ZF C are often used in the literature. For example, the power set axiom can be added, or the Separation or Collection schemes can be used with a wider class of formulas.
2.3. Examples of admissible sets. We have already mentioned the smallest admissible set, the set HF of hereditarily finite sets. A really large example of an admissible set, due to Kripke and Platek, is the set H(κ), consisting of all sets whose transitive closure has power < κ, where κ is an uncountable cardinal. The ordinal is o(H(κ)) = κ. An important special case is the set HC = H(ω 1 ) of hereditarily countable sets. Thus, o(HC) = ω 1 . Another example of an admissible set is the uncountable set L(ω 1 ). This admissible set satisfies full separation and collection. As for HC, the ordinal is o(L(ω 1 )) = ω 1 .
Using the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem, together with the Mostowski Collapsing Lemma, we obtain from L(ω 1 ) a whole family of countable admissible sets, of the form L(α), for arbitrarily large countable ordinals α. Thus, ω 1 is an admissible ordinal, and there are arbitrarily large countable admissible ordinals. For each admissible ordinal α,
There is a least admissible set with ω as an element, namely L(ω CK 1 ) (so ω and ω CK 1 are the first two admissible ordinals). More generally, it is shown in [18] that for each X ⊆ ω, there is a least admissible set A with X ∈ A; it is the set A = L(X, ω The "analytical" relations, on numbers n ∈ ω and functions f ∈ ω ω , are built up from "computable" relations by adding function quantifiers and number quantifiers. For an excellent introduction, see [58] . Roughly speaking, a relation R(x, f ), on numbers and functions, is computable if we can determine whether it holds, for a given x ∈ ω and f ∈ ω ω , by applying some effective procedure to x and restrictions f |t, for sufficiently large t. We may identify the restrictions f |t with their Gödel numbers. Formally, we say that R(x, f ) is computable if it has a pair of definitions of the forms (∀t) R 1 (f |t, x), and (∃t) R 2 (f |t, x), where R 1 (u, x), R 2 (u, x) are computable relations, of the usual kind, on pairs of numbers. Now, let S ⊆ ω. We say that S is Π R(u, x) , we get a uniformly computable family (T n ) n∈ω of trees, subsets of ω <ω which are closed under initial segments, such that for all n ∈ ω, n ∈ S if and only if T n has no path. We let T n be the set of sequences v such that for all initial segments u ⊆ v, R(u, n) holds. So, we have yet another definition of the class of Π There is a natural ordering on the elements of a tree T ⊆ ω <ω , the KleeneBrouwer ordering, such that the ordering is a well-ordering if and only if the tree has no path. Under the Kleene-Brouwer ordering, for σ, τ ∈ T , σ < τ if either σ ⊇ τ , or else there exist ν and m < n such that νm ⊆ σ and νn ⊆ τ . So, Theorem 2.4.2 yields the following. Kleene showed that the ∆ 1 1 subsets of ω are the same as the hyperarithmetical sets. Roughly speaking, these are the sets which are computable relative to one of a family of sets H(a) obtained by iterating the jump function over computable well orderings. For more about the hyperarithmetical sets, see [58] .
Kleene constructed a computable tree T ⊆ ω <ω which has a path, but no hyperarithmetical path (again, see [58] ). Harrison [30] , [31] showed that for such a tree T , the Kleene-Brouwer ordering has type ω 3.1. Completeness and compactness. Most of the results in this section appeared in Barwise's thesis, which combines infinitary logic with admissible sets. The monograph [37] describes the model theory of L ω1ω and its admissible fragments shortly after the appearance of Barwise's thesis, and illustrates the large and immediate impact that this work had on the subject.
Barwise re-worked the proof system for L ω1ω used by Lopez-Escobar, a sequent calculus, in such a way that the notion of a proof in L A is ∆ over KP , so for each admissible A, the set of proofs in L A is A-computable. This required some ingenuity-the usual notions of a proof as a sequence of formulas, or a tree of sequents, did not work. In this way, Barwise arrived at the following version of Completeness for countable admissible fragments. This is satisfying. The statement that the set of logically valid sentences is c.e. implies that there is a nice proof system, without referring to any particular one. A second version of Completeness produces models for some infinitary theories. Barwise's original arguments for these results were proof-theoretic. Later, Makkai [48] used consistency properties to give Henkin-style proofs.
Here is Kreisel's Compactness Theorem for ω-logic. The result appears as a footnote in [39] . The next result is a special case of Barwise Compactness which has had a number of recent applications in computable structure theory (see [2] is simpler, and we do that first. Let Γ be an A-c.e. set of sentences saying that < is a linear ordering of the universe, with an initial segment of type α, for each computable ordinal α. Every A-finite subset of Γ has a computable model. Therefore, by Barwise Compactness, Γ has a computable model.
To get a computable ordering of type ω CK 1 (1 + η), we must do a little more. We add to the vocabulary an infinite computable set B of constants, one for each element of the universe of our ordering. We add to Γ sentences saying that B is the universe, < is a computable linear ordering of B, and there is no hyperarithmetical sequence of elements of B which is <-decreasing.
Barwise's ideas continue to find new and unexpected applications. Arana, in his soon-to-be completed Ph.D. thesis, used Barwise Compactness to produce infinite families of sentences with special independence properties.
Theorem 3.2.3 (Arana). For each n ≥ 1, there exist a computable ordering (H, < H ) of type ω CK

(1+η) (the type of the Harrison ordering) and a computable function F from H to the set of finitary Π n sentences, in the vocabulary of arithmetic, such that
• for any set Γ of Σ n−1 and Π n−1 sentences, if P A ∪ Γ is consistent, then so is P A ∪ Γ ∪ {F (a) : a ∈ H}, • for all a ∈ H, and all sets Λ of Σ n sentences, if
If M is a nonstandard model of P A and n ∈ ω, then the set T n of finitary Σ n sentences true in M is coded in M in a natural way. Arana's independent sentences can be used to show that this property of nonstandard models of P A fails for various weak fragments of P A.
The Harrison ordering is a computable structure with 2 ℵ0 automorphisms, but with no non-trivial hyperarithmetical automorphism. Morozov [52] 
(Barwise). If A is a countable admissible set with A = HF, the Hanf number for L A is o(A) .
In the case where A = HF, L A is just the finitary logic L ωω , and the classical Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem tells us that the Hanf number of L HF is ℵ 0 . In the case where A = L(ω 
Theorem 3.3.2 (Barwise-Kunen). For an admissible set A = HF of arbitrary cardinality, the Hanf number of L A is h(A) .
In the paper [8] , Barwise shows that the Hanf number for second order logic is "badly behaved", and its existence requires very strong instances of the replacement axiom scheme.
Given an L-structure M and another vocabulary L ⊇ L, an expansion of M to L is an L -structure M which has the same universe, and the same interpretation of each symbol of L,
Here is another simple application of Barwise Compactness. Proof. Let F be the set of finite partial isomorphisms from M to N preserving satisfaction of L A formulas. We can show that F is a back-and-forth family. Suppose (a, b) ∈ F, and let c be a further element of M . We want d ∈ N such that (ac, bd) ∈ F . We add to L constants representing the elements of b and a further new constant e. We apply Theorem 3.3. If M belongs to a countable admissible set A, then for any tuple a in M , the orbit of a is defined by the conjunction of the L A formulas true of a. One consequence is the following result of Nadel [54] . and is not attained. Such a structure must have the feature that for each tuple, the orbit is defined by an L A -formula, but there is no set in A containing definitions for all of the orbits. However, Makkai [49] showed the following. and is not attained.
Theorem 3.3.3 (Expansions). Let A be a countable admissible set. Suppose L is an A-finite vocabulary, L is a finite extension of L, and M is an A-finite L-structure. Suppose Γ is an A-c.e. set of L A -sentences such that for each
The proof uses Theorem 3.2.5. The structure is an expansion of the an ordering of type (ω * + ω)ω, and it is absolutely characterizable.
Related to Theorem 3.3.6 is the fact that for a computable, or hyperarithmetical, Abelian p-group, the length (that is, the length of the Ulm sequence) is at most ω CK 1 . If the group is reduced, then the length is a computable ordinal. Similarly, for a computable, or hyperarithmetical, superatomic Boolean algebra, the isomorphism type must be I(ω α n), for some computable ordinal α and some n ∈ ω-this means that the Boolean algebra is a join of n α-atoms. In [21] , Barwise and Moschovakis gave abstract principles behind these results.
In [7] , Barwise proved the following surprising fact. Absoluteness was an important theme in Barwise's work. Theorem 3.3.8 seems to say that being constructible is not absolute. The proof uses Barwise Compactness, together with the Levy-Shoenfield Absoluteness Theorem, which says that a Σ sentence true in V (the real world of sets) is also true in L (the constructible world). §4. Admissible sets over M. The admissible sets we have considered up to this point are sometimes called pure admissible sets. We now introduce a larger collection, the admissible sets over an L-structure M. The axioms of KP , like those of ZF , were based on the idea that everything should be a set built up from ∅. We have seen that there is useful information to be gotten by locating a structure in an admissible set. However, membership of a structure in an admissible set is influenced very much by the way the structure has been built up. Barwise realized that it is possible to gain information about properties intrinsic to M-properties such as the Scott height-by taking the elements of M as "urelements" and building an admissible set over M.
Barwise fully developed his theory of admissible sets over a structure in the book [12] . An exposition of some basic results is given in [10] , and the first general treatment of admissible sets with urelements is in [11].
4.1. KP with urelements. For simplicity, we fix once and for all a finite vocabulary L with only relation and constant symbols. The theory KP U is intended to describe two-sorted structures of the form
where M is the collection of urelements,
is an L-structure, the family of sets A is disjoint from M , and ∈ is the membership relation restricted to (M ∪A)×A. We allow the possibility that M is the empty structure, and in this way, we get the pure admissible sets.
In writing the axioms, we need to distinguish between urelements and sets. Following Barwise, we use variables p, q, r . . . for urelements, a, b, c, . . . for sets, and x, y, z, . . . when we do not wish to distinguish between urelements and sets. Built into the definition of the two-sorted structures we are considering is the fact that (M, (R M ) R∈L ) is a structure for the vocabulary L. The classes of ∆ 0 and Σ formulas are defined exactly as before, except that one starts with atomic formulas in the two-sorted vocabulary L∪{∈}. Quantifiers are allowed over both sorts of variables.
We will also need to allow structures (M, A, E, (R M ) R∈L ), where the binary relation E ⊆ (M ∪ A) × A is not the ∈ relation, and perhaps not even wellfounded. The theory KP U is a first-order theory in the two-sorted vocabulary L ∪ {∈}. The axioms, describing the family of sets and the membership relation, are given below.
Axioms for KP U
Foundation: For each finitary formula ϕ(x, u) with no free occurrence of y, we have the axiom
Pairing: For all x, y, there is a set a such that x ∈ a & y ∈ a.
Union: For any set a, there is a set b such that (∀y ∈ a) (∀x ∈ y) x ∈ b ∆ 0 -separation: For each ∆ 0 formula ϕ(x, y) with no free occurrence of b, we have an axiom saying that for all y and for all sets a, there is a set b such that & ϕ(x, y)) ].
∆ 0 -collection: For each ∆ 0 formula ϕ(x, y) with no free occurrence of b, we have an axiom saying that for all y and all sets a, if (∀x ∈ a) (∃y) ϕ(x, y), then  there is a set b such that (∀x ∈ a) (∃y ∈ b) ϕ(x, y) .
We wish to generalize the notion of an admissible set to the notion of an admissible set over M. Intuitively, an admissible set over M should be a model of KP U which is "transitive over" M. As a first step, we say that
is a model of KP U over M if A M is a model of KP U , with M as its built-in L-structure. Next, we need to say what it means for the set A to be "transitive over" the set M . For this purpose, we introduce the cumulative hierarchy of sets over M .
. Now, a set A is transitive over M if it satisfies the following conditions.
• There is a least admissible set HF M over a given structure M, consisting of the hereditarily finite sets in V M . This has some mathematical interest. In [16] , Barwise and Eklof considered a principle stated by Lefschetz, saying that there is essentially only one algebraic geometry of each characteristic, not a different one for each domain. Over an algebraically closed field of a particular characteristic, Barwise and Eklof built a structure which seems to include all of the important objects occurring in algebraic geometry for that characteristic. There are separate sorts for integers, field elements, n-tuples of field elements, subfields finitely generated over the prime field, algebraic closures of finitely generated subfields, polynomials in various fixed tuples of variables, polynomial ideals, etc. All of the elements-of all sorts-come from the least admissible set over a certain two-sorted structure, with one sort for field elements, and the other for integers.
4.2. Truncation lemma. The Truncation Lemma is a valuable tool for building an admissible set over a given structure M by restricting an arbitrary model of KP U over M to its "well-founded part". To prepare the way, we need some definitions. A model
to be well-founded if the relation E is well-founded. One can readily check that every admissible set over M is well-founded, and every well-founded model of KP U over M is isomorphic to a unique admissible set over M. an end extension of B M if (A, E) is an end extension of (B, F ). Axioms for KP U + : This system has the axioms of KP U , plus an axiom saying that M is an element of A, that is, there is a set a whose elements are just the urelements p. Formally, the axiom is
Given a pair of models
We say that A M is an admissible set above M if A M is an admissible set over M and M ∈ A; i.e., A M satisfies the axioms of KP U + . The Truncation Lemma is used to prove the following key existence theorem in [12] . An inductive definition on a set X is a function Γ, from relations on X to relations (of the same arity) on X, such that Γ is monotone; that is, R ⊆ S implies Γ(R) ⊆ Γ(S). A fixed point for Γ is a relation R on X such that Γ(R) = R. A least fixed point of Γ is a fixed point of Γ which is a subset of every other fixed point of Γ. Proof. Uniqueness is trivial. Starting with ∅, we iterate Γ through steps corresponding to ordinals. Let Γ 0 = ∅, and for α > 0, let Γ α = Γ(∪ β<α Γ β ). There is a least ordinal α such that Γ α+1 = Γ α . Then Γ α is the least fixed point of Γ.
In the proof above, the ordinal α is called the closure ordinal for Γ, and is denoted by Γ .
Example: Let X be the set of all sentences in an admissible fragment L A . Let Γ be the operation taking a set R ⊂ X to the set S of sentences L A -provable from the set R in a single step. The least fixed point of Γ is the set of all sentences ϕ ∈ L A which are provable from the empty set. Another result in [13] shows that the closure ordinal of a structure M can differ radically from the ordinal o(HY P M ). ∞ω , there is a finitary formula ψ which is equivalent to ϕ on "almost all" finite structures. For more on these matters, see [32] , [24] . §5. Saturation properties. Saturated structures have long played a prominent role in classical model theory. In this chapter we consider newer notions of saturation which have a computable flavor and arise in the theory of admissible sets.
5.1. Computable saturation. We assume throughout this section that L is a computable vocabulary. Vaught [65] 
The advantage of countable computably saturated models over countable ω-saturated models is that they exist for every consistent elementary first order theory (Barwise and Schlipf [23] ).
Theorem 5.1.6 (Existence). Every structure has a computably saturated elementary extension of the same cardinality.
Computable saturation is also preserved under unions of elementary chains.
In applications of computable saturation, it is often useful to form the model pair (M, N ), which is the two-sorted structure built from M and N in the natural way. If the model pair (M, N ) is computably saturated, then each of the single structures M and N is computably saturated. However, it is possible for both single structures to be computably saturated while the model pair is not.
Schipf [61] demonstrated that computable saturation makes it possible to simplify many arguments in classical model theory by replacing a transfinite induction (often a back and forth construction) by an induction with just ω steps on countable structures. For example, he used computable saturated model pairs to give easy proofs of the Robinson consistency theorem and the Lyndon homomorphism theorem. He also gave a result which yields easy proofs of completeness for many particular elementary first order theories. The third edition of the book [26] took advantage of computably saturated structures to simplify several proofs from the earlier editions.
In [22] , Barwise and Schlipf studied computably saturated models of P A. They showed that for a countable model of P A, being computably saturated is the same as being expandable to a model of analysis; i.e., Induction plus ∆ 1 1 Comprehension. Lipschitz and Nadel [44] used the notion of computable saturation to characterize the additive parts of countable models of first order Peano arithmetic (P A). The set of axioms of P A which are sentences in the vocabulary with just + is known as Pressburger arithmetic. is satisfiable in M. The following result was proved in a special case by Schlipf [60] , and in general by Adamson [1] and Ressayre [58] . Ressayre [58] proved the following. There is an A-c.e. set Γ of L A sentences describing a structure of the form (M, X, R), where M is a model of KP including all of the ordinals in A, X ⊆ ω, and R is a linear ordering of ω which is computable in X and has an initial segment of order type α. By Theorem 5.2.2, there is a Σ A -saturated model (M, X, R) of Γ. Now, for β < α, the initial segment of R of type β is computable in X, so α ≤ ω X 1 . To complete the proof, it is enough to show that no ordering of type α on ω is computable in X, for then ω X 1 ≤ α. We suppose there is such an ordering S and arrive at a contradiction as follows. Consider the A-c.e. set of formulas Θ(y) saying that y ∈ ω and for each β < α there is a z ∈ ω such that S(z, y) and the initial segment of S below z has order type β. Every A-finite subset of Θ(y) is satisfied in (M, X, R), so by Σ A -saturation the whole set Θ(y) is satisfied in (M, X, R) by some element y ∈ ω. Therefore S cannot have order type α.
We now give a proof of Barwise's strengthening of the theorem of LopezEscobar and Morley on non-axiomatizability of the class of well orderings (Theorem 1.1.1). Proof. Let Γ be an A-c.e. set of sentences in L A , consisting of σ, axioms for linear orderings, and for each ordinal α ∈ A, a sentence saying that the ordering has an initial segment of type α. By Theorem 5.2.2, Γ has a Σ A -saturated model M = (M, R). Now, we can build an embedding f from the rationals into M by induction, making sure as we go along that for any finite subset of ran(f ), the intervals to the left of the first element, between two successive elements, and to the right of the last element, all have sub-intervals of type α for all α ∈ A. §6. Conclusion. Barwise's work in infinitary logic and admissible sets cut across the usual divisions in logic. When it appeared, the work was seen as unifying important parts of model theory, computability theory, and set theory. Right away, there were many applications. We have described some of them.
Barwise and others have shown that many of the methods developed for admissible fragments of the logic L ∞ω carry over to non-classical logics. See, for example, the paper of Barwise [14] on monotone quantifiers, the paper of Barwise, Kaufmann, and Makkai [19] on stationary logic, and the survey article of Nadel [55] , which includes a section on logic with extra propositional connectives.
The landscape of logic has changed in the past 30 years. The growth in the popularity of classification theory and o-minimal structures has left infinitary logic with a much diminished place in model theory. As a result, Barwise's idea of using HY P M to study a structure M has remained on the back burner. Perhaps this attractive idea will be taken up again by some future logician. On the other hand, infinitary logic is of growing importance for computable structure theory, finite model theory, and certain parts of theoretical computer science. The result of Arana, Theorem 3.2.3, is just one of many recent applications of Barwise Compactness in computable structure theory. It seems likely that there will be further applications in pure computability. There is general machinery, developed by Harrington, Ash [1] , and Lempp and Lerman [42] , for carrying out ∆ 0 α priority constructions, for an arbitrary computable ordinal α. Harrington asked, in a casual conversation in 1984, whether there might be general machinery which is the limit of such constructions. The Barwise Compactness Theorem does exactly this.
